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PRIVATE LAW
The practice of law is defined in La. R.S. 37:212. In Andrus
v. Guillot,30 a collection agency that engaged in the practice of
sending out notices to debtors and referring accounts to attor-
neys for collection on a split fee basis, was held to be practising
law in violation of this provision and not entitled to recover the
promised fee. In passing, the court observed that it was not
undertaking to "outlaw" collection agencies and indicated that,
although "peaceful collection or friendly adjustment" would not
constitute the practice of law, the collector cannot threaten with
legal proceedings or represent a creditor in court proceedings
either directly, or indirectly through an attorney engaged by
him.
To like effect, recovery was denied to an unlicensed person
who had engaged in a series of real estate transactions for
others on a fee basis over a period of time.31 The court dis-
tinguished Sheppard v. Hulseberg,32 where recovery was granted
to one who on an isolated occasion sold property for another for
a $100.00 fee. The court relied on La. R.S. 14:37 and 14:50.
In Abry Brothers v. Tillman33 the plaintiff contractor's ac-
ceptance of a post-dated check of a third party was held not to
constitute payment of the debt owed. The court found no agree-
ment, express or implied, to accept the checks in payment. In-
deed, there was clear evidence negativing any such intent. The




The Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari in the
case of Womack v. Sternberg.' The parties to an agreement for
an exchange of properties had affixed their signatures to two
30. 160 So. 2d 804 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
31. Maniscalco v. Glass, 163 So. 2d 438 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), writre-
fused, 165 So. 2d 479.
32. 171 La. 659, 131 So. 840 (1930).
33. 245 La. 1017, 162 So. 2d 346 (1964).
34. See 12 HENRI, LON & JEAN MAZEAUD, LEgONS DE DROIT CIVIL, OBLIGA-
TiONS n* 1225 (1962).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 162 So. 2d 119 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
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acts of sale and certain related agreements in writing devised to
effect the exchange. However, in the process some interlinea-
tions had been made in pencil on a carbon copy of one of the
writings and additional provisions had been written in longhand
on a separate sheet of paper by the notary who prepared the
acts, and he expressed a desire to have the document retyped.
Although the parties considered this procedure unnecessary they
agreed to return to affix their signatures to the redraft. De-
fendant failed to do so and announced his withdrawal. The court
of appeal held unnecessary the initialing of the added details,
and concluded that the evidence as a whole established a final
agreement between parties. It will be interesting to see whether
the decision is sustained, and, if not, whether the court will find
that inasmuch as the signatures of the parties were not affixed
to the additions, the rule requiring written evidence had not
been satisfied. This, it appears, is the basic issue, and the point
is an important one.
In Bornemann v. Richards2 the Supreme Court restated the
position it took in Daum v. Lehde,3 that where partial destruc-
tion of a thing covered by a contract to sell occurs before trans-
fer of title, Civil Code article 2455 applies and the buyer has
the choice of abandoning the contract or taking what is left,
with the price determined by appraisement. On the facts be-
fore it, however, the court went on to find article 2044 applicable
because the sale was subject to the suspensive condition of court
approval. Thus the purchaser had the choice of dissolving his
obligation (which he elected), or of taking the thing in the state
in which it was, without diminution of price. By its terms, ar-
ticle 2455 applies when, at the moment the sale takes place, the
thing has perished in whole or in part.4 As stated by Pothier,
the underlying theory is that if the thing is then totally de-
stroyed the sale falls for lack of an object, but if it is only par-
tially destroyed the object still exists. 5 Of course, the ultimate
basis of relief rests in the theory of error; article 2455 is ground-
ed on the assumption that the parties are not aware of what has
happened.6 By giving the buyer who elects to retain the pre-
2. 245 La. 851, 161 So. 2d 741 (1964). This case is also noted at 25 LA.
L. REV. 569 (1965).
3. 239 La. 607, 119 So. 2d 481 (1960).
4. 24 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL, DE LA VENTE n° 92 (4th ed. 1887).
5. 3 OEUVRES DE POTIIIER, TRAITIt DE CONTRAT DE VENTE n, 4 (2d ed. 1861)):
6. "If the loss is partial and the buyer knows of it, he may not invoke the
option accorded to him by article 1601 [La. Civil Code art. 2455] because he has
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served part the right to claim a diminution in the price, con-
sistency is established with the rule which gives the buyer a
right to a proportionate reduction in the price in the event of
a partial eviction.7 On the other hand, if the thing is impaired
before the transfer of ownership takes place, such as when there
is a suspensive condition, the only obligation of the seller is to
deliver it to the buyer in the state in which it is found. Since
the risk of impairment is not on the latter, he does not have to
take the thing. At the same time, if he elects to take it, he has
no claim for a diminution in price. According to Roman law and
to Pothier, impairment was at the buyer's risk, that is, if the
condition occurred he would have to take notwithstanding and
without any diminution. The draftsmen of the Code Napoleon
rejected this view on the basis of the principle res perit domino.8
If this is the controlling principle, it should apply under our law
to the case where the impairment of the thing occurs between
the confection of a preliminary contract to sell and the delivery
of the act of sale, because during this period the vendor is still
the owner. This would mean that, by virtue of our rule which
leaves risk of loss on the vendor in a contract to sell pending
delivery of an act of sale, impairment would not be at the buy-
er's risk, but neither would the buyer be entitled to a reduction
in price if he decided to require delivery of the thing.
Article 2568 of the Civil Code imposes a rigorous limit of
ten years on the exercise of a right of redemption. The limit in
the Code Napoleon is five years. The purpose of the redactors
of the latter in imposing a limitation was to overcome the an-
cient rule which applied a prescription of thirty years. They
considered the reservation of a right of redemption for such a
long period as injurious to the public interest in that it did not
comport with the necessities of cultivation or with the principle
consented with the intention of buying the thing in the state in which it is
found." 24 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL, DE LA VENTE no 92 (4th ed.
1887).
7. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2511 (1870).
8. "This decision [the decision of the Roman law] which Pothier adopted is
not in accord with the principle under which, in the case of the suspensive con-
dition, there is no transfer of ownership. That the thing is impaired or has be-
come deteriorated should be at the risk of the debtor, who is still the owner, for
the same reason that its loss is at his risk." Explanation of Bigot-Pr~ameneu.
See 13 FENET, RECUEIL COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PR]tPARATOIRES DU CODE CIVIL 243
(1836). See criticism of rule in 2 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET BARDE, TRAITit DE
DROIT CIVIL, DES OBLIGATIONS n* 854b (1905). The position of the authors is
that the buyer should bear the risk of impairment since he profits by any increase
which takes place before the condition occurs.
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that ownership should not be rendered uncertain and fluctuat-
ing.9 In 1909 a landowner conveyed a tract of land for a price
of $114,600.00 and reserved a right to redeem the land for not
exceeding $100.00 after removal of the cypress timber thereon.
In Steib v. Joseph Rathborne Land Co.10 the seller's suit to re-
cover the property from a subsequent purchaser was dismissed.
The agreement was held to be not a sale of timber nor a vente a
rgm&r6 but a special contract under which the vendee undertook
to reconvey the land. Plaintiff's suit was dismissed for failure
to tender the agreed price on filing the action. The finding that
the transfer was not a vente a remr6 was in answer to defend-
ant's contention that the ten-year period of redemption had ex-
pired and was based on the ground that since the vendor re-
served the right to redeem the land after it had been denuded of
the cypress he had not reserved the right to redeem the "thing"
sold within the meaning of article 2567. This reason seems to
the writer somewhat artificial. If the transfer was a sale of
land, as found, rather than a sale of timber, it seems to follow
that the "thing" which the plaintiff was seeking to redeem was
likewise "land." Although no discussion of this kind of problem
has been found in the French commentaries, Pothier, in consid-
ering the question of whether the redemptive price might be
greater or smaller than the price received, observed that there
would be nothing illicit in such a provision and nothing repug-
nant to the nature of the contract.1 Since there is likewise
nothing illicit in the vendor's granting to the vendee the right
to denude the land of timber and nothing repugnant to the res-
ervation of a right of redemption with respect to the land, the
transaction in question might well have been treated as a vente
a r6mgr. In addition, the considerations of policy which dic-
tated the adoption of a ten-year period for the exercise of a right
of redemption under a vente a rgm&r6 seem equally applicable
to the contract before the court.12
An intriguing and baffling problem was presented to the
9. 24 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL, DE LA VENTE n 384 (4th ed.
1887).
10. 163 So. 2d 429 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
11. 3 OEUVRES DE POTHIER, TRAIT DE CONTRAT DE VENTE n*0 413-414 (2d ed
1861). See also 5 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS, DE LA VENTE no 357
(6th ed. 1946).
12. It may be noted, also, that the fruits of the thing belong to the purchaser
until the right of redemption is exercised (LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2575 (1870)), and
even if the vendee might not be permitted to cut growing timber except for his
own use (but see id. art. 551, and Patterson v. Bonner, 19 La. 508 (1841).
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Third Circuit in Humble Oil Ref. Co. v. Boudoin.13 At issue was
the question whether the heirs of a deceased mother could assert
their rights by way of inheritance to her one-half interest in
community property sold after her death by the father to an
heir of a second marriage. All the heirs of both marriages had
unconditionally accepted their father's succession. On rehear-
ing, the court reversed its original opinion and held the plain-
tiff heirs estopped to assert their rights. It is clear that if the
sale by the father had been to a stranger, the plaintiffs, having
accepted their father's succession unconditionally, would have
been estopped to contest the buyer's title.14 Since the transferee
was an heir who had also accepted, unconditionally, his father's
succession, the court had to decide whether estoppel would oper-
ate in his favor. It so held. Two judges, dissenting, believed
that the theory of estoppel should operate against the transferee
as well as the plaintiff heirs, and that mutual cancellation would
take place. The writer finds himself in sympathy with this re-
sult. It seems inaccurate to say, as did the majority opinion,
that the father owed only a duty to pay damages to the heirs
whose property he had undertaken to transfer. 15 He owed them,
as the owners of a half interest in the property, the obligation
to render to them that which was theirs, which would compre-
hend the negative obligation not to do anything prejudicial to
their right.' Having violated this obligation, his primary duty,
therefore, was to restore them to their former position. The
existence of this duty should not be affected by the fact that he
might not have been able to fulfill it, or that another form of
relief might have been available to them, namely, revendication.
13. 154 So. 2d 239 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
14. Griffing v. Taft, 151 La. 442, 91 So. 832 (1922); Robinson v. Dunson,
65 So. 2d 643 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953).
15. "The point, at which we fell into error in our original opinion, was in
stating that Pierre Boudoin, by attempting to sell the one-half interest of the six
heirs, became obligated to return this interest to said heirs. We now perceive
that Pierre had no legal duty to return to the heirs their interest in the property.
He could not return it. He never owned it. After the sale to Leon he didn't even
own his own one-half interest. Pierre's liability to the six heirs was solely for
damages." Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Boudoin, 154 So. 2d 239, 250 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1963).
16. "It makes no difference that he who has sold as his own a thing that he
•knows belongs to me, possesses it without title, or by virtue of a just title . . . for
although he possesses it under onerous title, although he bought it in good faith,
as long as he knows that it belongs to me he has not the less contracted the
obligation to render it to me. The natural law does not prohibit only the taking,
but also the retaining of the property of another." 3 OEUVRES DE POTHIER, TRAITIk
DE CONTUAT DE VENTE n 773 (2d ed. 1861). See also Kramer v. Freeman, 198
La. 244, 3 So. 2d 609 (1941) ; LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 535, 2301, 2312 (1870).
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It follows, therefore, that when the transferee accepted his
father's succession he assumed this duty. Furthermore, he was
in a position to discharge it by an act recognizing the interest
of the plaintiff heirs. Thus, the duty he owed them should have
nullified his right to demand that they defend his acquisition.
The Uniform Commercial Code gives to the parties to com-
mercial transactions a very considerable latitude with pro-
visions relating to price. The price can be left open, or for
further agreement, or for fixing on the basis of an agreed mar-
ket or by one of the parties, for example, and the contract will
be found binding, if the parties so intend, and enforced on the
basis of a reasonable price. 17 Our courts have not been so le-
nient. In Princeville Canning Co. v. Hamilton8 an agreement in
writing covering the purchase and sale of sweet potatoes over
a period of time contained a provision reading, "Contract prices
will increase according to market rise." The court apparently
construed this provision as constituting an agreement on the
part of the parties to buy and sell at the market price, but found
no agreement between them on how the market price was to be
established. It therefore concluded that the agreement was too
indefinite to be enforceable. The legislature is contemplating
consideration of the Uniform Commercial Code for adoption in
Louisiana. If it had been applicable, a different judgment might
have been rendered in this case, but this possibility should cause
no alarm. There is much to be said in favor of enforcing com-
mercial agreements.
In Succession of Clark9 a married son with two children
made a transfer in the form of a sale to his father. It was held
that the plaintiff, as a forced heir of the transferor, was entitled
to establish by parol evidence that no price was paid and that
the transfer was a donation. It was further held that the trans-
fer was reducible to the extent that it exceeded the disposable
portion. The court observed that article 2239 establishes only a
rule of evidence, not a property right; that it does not enlarge
the right of a forced heir to the legitime or decrease the dis-
posable portion. The conclusion was, therefore, that plaintiff
was entitled to annul or reduce the transfer to the extent it
impinged on the legitime. Since the transfer was not to a forced
17. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-305.
18. 159 So. 2d 14 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
19. 155 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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heir the conclusion seems correct. It is not clear, however,
whether this was based on the allegations in plaintiff's petition
or on the theory that in no event could such a transfer be an-
nulled in its entirety. Where the evidence shows that a simu-
lated transfer was intended rather than a real transfer by way
of donation, disguised, however, in the form of a sale, a pro-
nouncement of total invalidity would be in order even with re-
spect to the disposable portion.
20
In Succession of Lewis21 a father's attempt to prejudice the
rights of his forced heirs to his separate property by a sale to a
third party followed by a reconveyance to him. and his second
wife was declared a fraudulent simulation and annulled in its
entirety. Of course, the ancestor manifestly intended to benefit
his wife out of a spirit of liberality and he could have made a
donation to her that would have been effective with respect to
the disposable portion. Nevertheless, his undertaking, by means
of the two sales, to establish in her a right to a share in the
property as a partner in the existing community could clearly




In Morrison v. Faulk22 it was properly held that the purchase
by a lessor of the lessee's right of occupancy did not defeat his
privilege on the movables of the lessee notwithstanding that the
sale of the right of occupancy was made first. The lessee's at-
tempt to distinguish the case of Ranson v. Voiron23 on this basis
was found without merit.
The mere acceptance by a lessor of less than the whole rent
due at any time does not evidence an intention voluntarily to
surrender the right to the balance due, nor is any element of
estoppel present. This was the view the court took in Nagem v.
* 20. Whether such a result was intended by the amendment to art. 2239 has
been questioned. See Lemann, Some Aspects of Simulation in France and Louisi-
.ana, 29 TUL. L. REV. 22, 48 (1954). But see Schalaida v. Gonzales, 174 La. 907,
142 So. 123 (1923); Johnston v. Bearden, 127 So. 2d 319 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1961), cert. denied; Westmore v. Harz, 111 La. 305, 35 So. 578 (1902).
21. 157 So. 2d 321 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
22. 158 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), writ refused, 245 La. 643, 160
8o.2d 229 (1964).
23. 176 La. 718, 146 So. 681 (1933).
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Foret's Drug Store.24 The lessor, however, had consented to a
reduction for a period of three months and his right should have
been limited accordingly. The opinion appears to suggest the
contrary. If acceptance by the lessee of the proffered reduction
was considered lacking it might well have been inferred from
his continuing to occupy the premises and make payments on
the rent.
A lessor, under a lease which prohibited sub-leasing without
his consent, rejected a tendered sub-lessee and then leased sim-
ilar space to the same person. The lessee sued for cancellation
of the lease and damages. It was held that a cause of action had
been stated.25 Although the court recognized prior jurisprudence
to the effect that the provision in article 2725 reading, "this
clause [interdicting sub-leasing] is always construed strictly"
requires strict construction against the lessee, it concluded that
on the clear proof before the court the lessor did not have the
right arbitrarily to reject the sub-lessee. The language of the
French Code is, "cette clause est toujours de rigueur." A trans-
lation less ambiguous than that in article 2725 might have been,
"this clause is always to be enforced rigorously." There is no
doubt this is what the redactors meant. At the same time, the
French courts have now tempered the application of the pro-
vision and have assumed control over the legitimacy of the
lessor's refusal under the doctrine of the abuse of rights or on
the ground that when the contract expressly recognizes the pos-
sibility of sub-leasing there is an implied obligation on the part
of the lessor not to cause prejudice to the value of the lessee's
interest by his own act.28
Labor or Industry
In Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, Inc.2 7 the Supreme
Court, by way of dictum, said of a contract binding the employer
to provide employment for a longer period than allowed by ar-
ticle 167 of the Civil Code: "But if the employee has given, in
24. 162 So. 2d 354 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), writ refused, 246 La. 368, 164
So.2d 358 (1964).
25. Gamble v. New Orleans Housing Mart, Inc., 154 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1963).
26. 5 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS, DU LOUAGE 253 and note 8 (6th
ed. 1946) ; 6 id. 461. See also 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH
TRANSLATION BY TIE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no 1752 and note 42
(1959).
27. 174 La. 66, 139 So. 760 (1932).
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addition to the services which he promised to perform, a consid-
eration, whatever the nature of such consideration be, then he
has in effect purchased, for a valuable consideration, an option
to keep the employment for the term specified; and such a con-
tract is a valid one." This writer believes that this is sound doc-
trine not in conflict with the prohibition against an employee's
binding himself for a period exceeding ten years as now al-
lowed. 28 Indeed, it is also believed that the employer should be
able to bind himself for any term even if his only purpose in
doing so is to induce the employee to accept employment on an
"at-will basis" as far as the employee is concerned. The notion
that an employer cannot legally bind himself for a term unless
the employee binds himself for a like term is contrary to the
genius of our system and to a recent pronouncement of the Su-
preme Court.29 The prohibition in the Code seems clearly de-
signed to protect an employee against the possibility of binding
himself for a period longer than ten years. Surely this policy
should not be held to deprive the employee of the benefit of an
employer's promise of a lifetime job given in return for sur-
render by the employee of his claim for workmen's compensa-
tion. Nevertheless, the discharged employee's suit was dismissed
in Smith v. Sohio Petroleum Co. 3
0
The Supreme Court has granted an application for a writ
of certiorari in the case of S. & W. Investment Co. v. Otis W.
Sharp & Son,31 wherein the lower court imposed on the owner
the risk of loss of the shell of an incompleted swimming pool
for which he had contracted. This holding resulted from an ap-
plication of article 2761 of the Civil Code, which covers work
composed of detached pieces, or made at the rate of so much a
measure, and a finding that the owner had made a "progress
payment" of $3,000.00 upon the completion of the shell. Judge
Yarrut dissented. There is need for a clarification of the rights
of the parties under construction contracts calling for progress
payments. It is doubtful that payments on account during the
course of construction work should be counted as an acceptance
of what has been done at least in the absence of a special impu-
28. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 167, as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 355.
29. See Long v. Foster & Associates, 242 La. 295, 136 So. 2d 48 (1961);
LA. CIvIL CODE art. 2036. Even the common law doctrine of consideration does
not require a different result. Newhall v. Journal Printing Co., 105 Minn. 44,
117 N.W. 228 (1908).
30. 163 So. 2d 124 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
31. 162 So. 2d 171 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
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tation of the payment by the contract to the completed portion
or portions.8 2
The decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Diesel
Equipment Corp. v. Epstein"3 has been affirmed by the Supreme
Court34 and will be reviewed next year.
TORTS
Wex S. Malone*
The enlarged scope of the Symposium on the Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts faces the reviewer with a choice of
three approaches. First, in considering the several hundred
torts decisions of the past year the reviewer could list and give
a bare abstract of all the cases. This, I am sure, can be better
done by the commercial digesters. Second, he can select for a
little more detailed discussion those cases which he regards as
"important" and ignore the remainder; or, finally, he can carve
out of the mass of cases just a few areas that he regards as
offering an unusual challenge. This highly limited approach
makes possible a relatively full discussion within its narrow
compass. This reviewer has chosen the last of these three
alternatives. My choice was dictated almost entirely by per-
sonal preference and the feeling that I can be of more service in
this way. The reader, however, will recognize that many im-
portant decisions that otherwise would deserve discussion have
been ignored.
LIABILITY OF PROPRIETORS OF PUBLIC PLACES
Res Ipsa Loquitur
At times difficult duty problems lurk behind what appear
to be simple matters of evidential proof. While Mrs. Pilie was
proceeding down an aisle in a Baton Rouge National Food Store,
two six-bottle cartons of Coca-Cola suddenly fell from a display
32. See 5 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS, DU LOUAGE, n* 374 (6th ed.
1946).
33. 159 So. 2d 1 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1960).
34. 169 So. 2d 61 (La. 1964).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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